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by 
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INTRODUCTION 
Quite early on, it became clear that Qatar's oil reserves were very 
small compared to those of some of its neighboring Gulf State neigh-
bors. The country has estimated crude reserves of 3,200 million barrels, 
or less than one percent of the world total. This is equivalent to about 30 
years output at current levels and represents a tiny proportion of the 
Gulf region's reserves. The country does have significant gas reserves 
which are estimated at 4,400 million cubic meters, or more than four 
percent of the world total. Only the US, Soviet Union, Iran and Abu 
Dhabi have larger reserves. 
As a result of its somewhat limited natural wealth, Qatar was the first 
of the Arab Gulf states to commit itself firmly to industry as a means of 
diversifying its economy. To this end, a detailed study of development 
opportunities in Qatar was undertaken shortly after the accession (1972) 
of Shaikh Khalifa. 
A plan was accepted by the government at the end of 1973 providing 
development guidelines for the next two decades. It emphasized the 
need for acceleration in housing and paid special attention to the deve-
lopment of the capital city of Doha, as well as encouraging light and 
heavy industry and expansion of the fishing industry1• 
The overall approach endorsed by Shaikh Khalifa was to concentrate 
on infrastructure and diversification of the economy. Initially, a 
Japanese-run steel plant, a Norwegian-run nitrogen fertilizer plant and 
a French-run petrochemicals plant gave the Qataris a chance to itl.itiate 
the industrialization process. As a result of these developments Qatar 
did get in ahead of some of its neighbors in the development of heavy 
industry. 
•Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
(I) Economist Intelligence Unit, Arabian Peninsula: Economic structure and Analysis (London: 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 1988), p. 95. 
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The purpose of this paper is to assess Qatar's industrialization efforts 
to date. What progress has been made toward industrial diversification 
and in what sense? How has Qatar's industrial performance compared 
with that of neighboring Arab Gulf economies? What particular pro-
blems must be overcome if the industrial diversification process is to 
continue? What are the prospects for the future? 
The Manufacturing Sector: Overview 
The policy of industrial diversification pursued since independence in 
1971 has given Qatar one of the most advanced heavy industries in the 
Gulf. The principal manufacturing industries are based at Umm Said, 
which has now become the country's industrial center. The majority of 
small industries are also located there. 
The manufacturing sector in Qatar is dominated by downstream oil 
processing as well as steel, fertilizer and cement production. The manu-
facturing sector also encompasses a large number of small establish-
ments as well as a few food processing, plastic and general hardware 
factories which account for about one third of manufacturing output. 
The light industries are largely oriented to meet the local demand for 
products.2 
The main manufacturing plants outside the oil and gas sector include 
the Qatar Steel Company, the Qatar National Cement Factory and the 
Qatar Flour Mills Company. 
The manufacturing sector in Qatar encompasses two distinct seg-
ments: on the one hand there is a handful of energy-intensive heavy 
industrial installations which are primarily joint ventures between the 
government and foreign partners, and there are a number of relatively 
small-scale industries owned by the Qatari private sector. 
The manufacturing sector in Qatar ranges from simple traditional 
crafts to some of the most modern sophisticated plants. At one end, it 
includes a host of small and quasi-artisan establishments, at the other, 
the manufacture of steel and major world-scale operations in the petro-
chemical and NGL industries. In the early 1980s more than one half of 
total manufacturing employment was in establishments employing less 
then five employees. Thus, industrial development in Qatar represents 
(2) United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Qatar: Towards Industrial Diversification 
of an Oil-based Economy (Vienna: UNIDO, 1988), p.5 . 
. 
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an unusual combination of a few giant enterprises and a large number 
of small enterprises. 
The North Field Gas Project 
Qatar is embarking on its most ambitious development project to 
bring its giant North Field gas fields into production. It is one of the 
largest accumulations of non-associated gas in the world, whose pro-
ductive life span could stretch for as long as 200 years. The project itself 
represents a total investment of$ 950 million and is designed to provide. 
the capacity to produce 23 million cubic meters/day of gas. Marketed 
gas output amounting to some 20 million cubic meters/ day will be sup-
plied to industrial users within Qatar. 
The importance of North Field gas to Qatar cannot be overstressed. 
All of Qatar's national industries, power, and water stations have been 
designed to use gas as an energy source. When the projects were being 
installed, daily production of oil was around 450,000 barrels, providing 
a ready source of associated gas which was stripped to provide fuel 
feedstock for the petrochemicals plant and liquid gases for domestic 
users and export. 
A supplementary source of gas was available from a small concentra-
tion of non-associated gas in the Khuff formation near the oil fields in 
the west of the penisula. The decline in oil output and the near exhaus-
tion of the Khuff source has made the North Field project a necessity 
rather than a luxury. Production of gas should be underway by late 1989 
or early 1990. 
Government Policies Towards Industry 
In pursuit of the Government's goal of diversifying and expanding 
the country's manufacturing base and to increase the involvement of 
authority, the Industrial Development Technical Center (IDTC) was set 
up in 1981 to monitor the development of the country's industrial 
sector. 
The center plays a vital and pioneering role in organizing and direc-
ting the pattern of industrialization. The Center prepared the First 
Five-year Industrial Development Plan for 1974-78, all elements of 
which were successfully put into effect. The projects conceived under 
the plan were all operational by the end of 1982, including a number of 
huge and sophisticated industries such as the manufacture of steel, 
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chemical fertilizers, petrochemicals, refined petroleum products, 
natural gas liquids, cement, as well as important domestic and socially 
necessary projects such as an organic fertilizer plant and a modern plant 
to meet the local demand for fresh meat. 
The center played a pivotal role in the development of the industrial 
part of Umm Said and the conversion of Umm Said to a major indus-
trial center. Projects being undertaken by the Center at present include a 
scheme for the development of medium and light industries. In 1985 the 
IDTC carried out studies on a number of industrial projects, including a 
sheet glass factory, production of silicone and ferro silicone, expansion 
of the cement factory, extraction of argon gas from by-products of 
QAFCO, manufacture of acetylene, production of calcium carbide, 
production of medical compounds, manufacture of benyoic salts and 
recycling of waste paper. 
The Center is presently engaged in promoting the development of 
import-substituting light and medium-sized industries. A new law rela-
ting to industrialization was enacted in March 1985 with a view to limi-
ting foreign ownership to certain specific industrial projects. Non-
Qataris are allowed to own only small business and light repair facilities 
which do not employ more than one person. However, foreign partici-
pation is welcomed in industrial projects, with the general provision that 
the local partner holds at least 51 percent of the company's capital.3 
Incentives such as tax relief and extremely low rents in specified 
industrial zones are offered in addition to free infrastructure and sub-
sidized utilities to enterprises favorably considered by the Industrial 
Development Technical Centre for fostering the process of industriali-
zation in Qatar. 
Two employment surveys conducted in January 1983 and during 
October 1984-February 1985 show that Qatar continues to be heavily 
dependent on expatriate workers who constituted about 80 percent of 
the country's total labor force in 1985. However, about 42 percent of 
the government employees were Qatari nationals. The government 
policy aims at minimizing the need for foreign lab~r. 




Incentives for Potential Investors 
A unique aspect of industrial development policy in Qatar is the 
assistance provided by the government in the pre-investment phase.4 
This involves two forms of assistance: first, a specialized government 
agency prepares investment feasibility studies on industries and offers 
them to the private sector as potential investment opportunities; and 
second, the Government supplements the efforts of private investors in 
preparation of economic and technical feasibility studies on new ven-
tures selected as possible targets for investments. 
The Government set up the Doha Industrial Estate at a site on the 
Salva Road for the use of light and medium industries while other 
industrial zones have been provided in Umm Said for medium and 
heavy industries. In these zones land and services are offered at subsi-
dized prices. Land required for industrial projects at the Doha Indus-
trial Estate is provided on long-term lease at token rents according to 
the size and nature of the project. Plots range from 1,500 sq.m to 3,000 
sq m while rents range from QR25 per sq.meter to QR50 per sq meter 
per annum. In Umm Said ground rent is net at QRl .00 per sq. meter 
annum. Given the increase in land prices and ground rent outside the 
industrial areas, these prices are a considerable incentive. Leases are 
normally offered for 30 years, which are renewable. Essential utilities 
such as water, electricity and gas are provided to industrial ventures in 
the industrial zones. 
Under the terms of Article I of Law No. 3166 the Minister of Finance 
and Petroleum is empowered to exempt national joint stock companies 
from payment of tax on net profits provided that the companies con-
cerned establish and operate permitted indusries in the interests of of the 
national economy. The exemption is valid for five years form the date 
of establishment of the company and may be renewed for a further 
period of five years. 
Government spending is the main catalyst for economic activity in 
Qatar and priority is given to national products by state purchasing 
departments. This policy provides a major incentive for local industries. 
But preference is only given provided that the local product is similar in 
(4) United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Development Review Series, 
Qatar: Towards Industrial Diversification of an Oil-based Economy (Vienna: UNJDO, 1988), 
p.26. 
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quality, specifications and price to rival imported products. The limit is 
to ensure that new industries grow on a healthy competitive basis and 
are attuned to the reality of world market conditions. 
Under the Industry Law No. 11 of 1980, the following incentives are 
granted to manufacturing establishments:5 
1. Customs tariffs may be increased for limited periods on the goods 
imported that are similar to those produced locally. There is however 
a requirement that the quality of the local production is satisfactory, 
and that the discouragement of imports is in the interest of consu-
mers. 
2. Holidays from incomes tax may be granted for five years as from the 
commencement of production. 
3. Holidays from customs duties may be granted on the following 
imports needed by industrial firms: (machinery, equipment and spare 
parts, and (b) raw materials, semifinished goods and packing mate-
rials. 
4. Exports of goods produced locally are exempted from export taxes, 
should these be imposed. At present no duties are levied on exports. 
5. Goods produced locally are given priority for government purchases, 
provided they are similar in quality and kind to imported equivalents. 
The priority still prevails even if the local price is up to 5 percent 
higher than the imported one. 
6. The establishment of new industry is encouraged by the supply of 
land and utilities at reduced rates. 
7. The Ministry of Industry and Agriculture may participate in the costs 
of studies and research carried out by the owners of proposed indus-
trial projects to ensure the feasibility of such projects. 
8. Loans may be granted to any industrial firm with a capital of less 
than QR 20 million at low interest. 
Perhaps as a direct result of these policies the economy has undergone 
rapid structural change since the early 1970s. In particular the manu-
facturing sector has experienced a major expansion in its contribution to 
economic activity. 
(5) Saba and Co., Touche Ross International, Tax and Investment Profile: Qatar, Restricted Activi-
ties, July 1986. 
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Recent Economic Trends 
Crude oil accounted for approximately 30 percent of GDP in 1987 
(Table 1). Between 1983 and 1987 it account for 91-94 percent of export 
earnings. Since 1981 Qatar has, like other OPEC states, suffered from 
the impact of the world oil glut. Between 1983 and 1987 the oil sector 
declined by 15 percent with the non-oil sectors increasing by only 0.3 
percent for the period as a whole. 
Qatar's manufacturing sector accounted for 5.0 percent of GDP and 
11.0 percent of non-oil GDP in 1980. There was a fairly steady increase 
in manufacturing output in the 1980s so that by 1987 the sector 
accounted for 9.9 percent of GDP and 14.3 percent of non-oil GDP. Of 
course, the increase in the share of GDP accounted for by manufactu-
ring is somewhat inflated by the decline in the oil sector. The increase in 
manufacturing's share of non-oil GDP therefore is more indicative of 
the success achieved by the country at industrial diversification. But 
even here we get an inflated figure because of various subsidies--low 
utility rates, low rents etc., received by industry. 
Qatar's accomplishments at industrial diversification are impressive 
when compared with the progress made by other Arab Gulf countries. 
For the basis of this comparison, an analysis was made of the move-
ments over time of the four main components of non-oil Gross 
Domestic Product: manufacturing, construction, services and the dis-
tributional sectors. Here the distributional sectors consist of: (a) com-
merce, restaurants, and hotels, (b) transportation, commerce and sto-
rage, and (c) finance, insurance and banking. Services include: housing, 
government services and other services. 
As noted above, there are serious problems in using movements in 
sectoral output as a measure of structural change. Yet, the selection of 
any alternative definition of sectoral output would be somewhat arbi-
trary. To overcome these problems, an index was created for each of the 
four main sectoral outputs. The index was formed from two measures 
of each sector's output: (a) share of non-oil GDP, and (b) absorption 
(total consumption and investment expenditures). 
To avoid using a simple arbitrary weighting system, a orthagonal 
factor analysis was made on the eight observations for each of three 
years: (a) 1974, the beginning of the oil boom, (b) 1981, the end of the 
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Table 1 
Qatar: Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1982-87 
(QR million, at current prices) 
Sector 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Oil Sector 15,001 10,790 11,330 9,595 5,395 5,630 
Non-Oil Sectors 12,651 12,815 13,787 12,803 12,868 12,950 
Agriculture 190 195 206 213 237 241 
Manufacturing 1,391 1,464 1,829 1,770 1,777 1,847 
Electricity 89 133 165 191 363 359 
Construction 1,829 1,395 1,411 1,313 1,054 1,086 
Trade 1,775 1,587 1,506 1,186 1,149 1,172 
Transport 458 450 480 450 410 412 
Finance 2,308 2,031 1,919 1,899 1,842 1,958 
Other services 4,611 5,560 6,162 5,781 6,036 5,875 
Gross Domestic 
Product 27,652 23,605 25,008 22,398 18,263 18,580 
OJo GDP 
Oil 54.2 45.7 45.3 42.8 29.5 30.3 
Agriculture 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.3 
Manufacturing 5.0 6.2 7.3 7.9 9.7 9.9 
Electricity 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 2.0 1.9 
Construction 6.6 5.9 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.9 
Trade 6.4 6.7 6.0 5.3 6.3 6.3 
Transport 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 
Finance 8.3 8.6 7.7 8.4 10.1 10.6 
Other services 16.7 23.6 24.6 25.8 33.1 31.6 
O?o Non-oil GDP 
Agriculture 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 
Manufacturing 11.0 11.4 13.3 13.8 13.8 14.3 
Electricity 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.8 2.8 
Construction 14.5 10.9 10.2 10.3 8.2 8.4 
Trade 14.0 12.3 10.9 9.3 8.9 9.1 
Transport 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.2 
Finance 18.2 15.8 13.9 14.8 14.3 15. l 
Other services 36.4 43.4 44.7 45.2 46.9 45.4 




available. The data sample was taken from the Arab Monetary Fund,6 
and included the twenty Arab members of the Fund. 
The factor analysis identified four main trends in the data. As it 
turned out, the sectoral shares of non-oil GDP and absorption are cor-
related closely enough so that each of the factors represented one of the 
four main sectors. The resulting factor scores for each sector (Table 2), 
therefore, represent the relative7 ranking of each of the twenty countries 
in terms of the development of each sector. 
More specifically, the factor scores have a mean of zero. The country 
with the highest positive factor score on a particular sector possesses the 
largest share (relative to the other nineteen countries) of that sector in its 
economy. Similarly, the country with the lowest (negative) factor score 
has the smallest share of that sector in its economy. The rest of the 
countries will be ranked between. 
Several interesting trends were identified: 
1. Qatar began the period (1974) with a factor score of 0.56. This placed 
the country in the lower half of Arab states in terms of industrial 
diversification, and fourth among the six Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) countries. 
2. At this time, the country's development of distributive activities 
ranked first among Arab states. In addition, the country had a large 
proportion of its economic activity devoted to construction (second 
among GCC states), but ranked relatively low in terms of service 
activities. 
3. By the end of the oil boom (1981), several dramatic changes had 
taken place. Most importantly, the country now ranked in the top 
half of Arab World states in terms of industrial diversification (and 
third among GCC countries). 
4. Growth during the years of expanding oil revenues had also resulted 
in the relative expansion of the service sector, so that by 1981 Qatar 
ranked first among GCC countries in terms of the relative share of its 
output devoted to these activities. 
(6) Arab Monetary Fund, National Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Mone-
tary Fund, 1987). 
(7) Only the results for the Gulf Countries are reported here. 
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Table 2 
Arab Gulf States: 
Structural Evolution, 1974-85 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distrib Serv 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension--1974 
Qatar -0.56 1.18 3.04 0.47 
UAE -1.01 0.71 1.45 -0.76 
Bahrain 2:p 0.34 -0.88 2.03 
Saudi Arabia 1.50 0.32 0.34 -0.46 
Oman -1.54 2.22 -0.87 0.16 
Kuwait 0.10 -0.37 -1.20 0.93 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension--1981 
Qatar 0.50 0.37 0.89 1.64 
UAE 0.59 1.22 1.26 -0.58 
Bahrain 2.32 -0.31 2.26 0.72 
Saudi Arabia 0.24 2.07 -0.97 0.21 
Oman -1.67 0.24 1.34 0.36 
Kuwait -0.02 -0.33 0.56 1.36 
Oil Economies Sectorial Dimension--1985 
Qatar 0.79 0.29 0.16 2.75 
UAE 1.37 1.23 1.34 -0.02 
Bahrain 0.86 0.40 1.96 0.59 
Saudi Arabia -0.16 1.60 -0.78 0.57 
Oman -1.53 0.39 1.11 0.23 
Kuwait -0.42 -0.87 -0.22 1.00 
Notes: Factor analysis based on orthagonal rotation. Data from Arab Monetary Fund, National 
Accounts of Arab Countries, 1974-85 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, 1987). 
5. In contrast to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the growth of manufactu-
ring and services in Qatar occurred in part at the expense of cons-
truction and distributional activities. 
6. In contrast to Bahrain, Qatar was able to expand its manufacturing 
sector in an environment characterized by a high proportion of acti-
vities devoted to distribution. 
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7. By the end (1985) of the period under consideration, Qatar ranked 
only behind the UAE in terms of relative industrial diversification. At 
the same time, Qatar had expanded its service activities to rank first 
in the Arab World. 
8. Despite the rapid development of services, the country had achieved 
balance among its major sectors-all four ranked in the top half rela-
tive to the nineteen other Arab world countries. Of the GCC states, 
only Bahrain achieved similar sectoral balance. 
In sum, the factor scores show that Qatar underwent major structural 
changes during the decade following the 1973174 oil price increases. 
This structural change resulted in the achievement of a major national 
objective--industrial diversification and reduced dependence on the oil 
sector. 
Industrial Performance 
Before one can conclude that Qatar's development has been a major 
success story, a more detailed examination has to be made of develop-
ments in specific industries (Tables 3 and 4). In this regard, the overall 
performance of the manufacturing sector does not seem to have mat-
ched the rate at which the country's industrial base expanded along the 
path of economic diversification. 8 In particular, the performance of 
Qatar's heavy industries remains vulnerable to the supply of feedstock 
and to fluctuating and, more recently, declining demand and prices for 
its major exports. 
(8) A conclusion also reached by UNIDO. See United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 






Qatar: Production (Value) 
of Major Industrial Companies, 1982-1987 
(Million QR) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Qatar Fertilizer Co. 
Ammonia/Urea 438.8 416.8 541.7 450.0 31 l.6 284.l 
Organic Fertilizer 
Factory 
Organic Fertilizer 0.66 0.73 0.60 0.90 l.00 l.90 
Qatar National 
Cement Co 
Portland Cement 67.7 38.9 52.8 43.3 29.4 20.7 
Resisting Cement 8.4 13.0 18.7 
Quick Lime 7.2 6.3 6.5 6.0 4.9 4.2 
Hydrated Lime 0.9 0.4 0.6 
Qatar Steel Company 
Concrete Bars 490.5 457.l 417.2 429.5 439.5 420.8 
Iron ore fines 2.0 10.0 2.0 l.O 2.8 0.6 
Qatar Flour Mills Company 
Flour No. (A) 13.3 12.5 12.8 13.5 16.7 17.6 
Flour No. (B) 4.0 5.6 6.3 2.1 3.3 3.8 
Bran 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.7 4.0 
Qatar Petrochemical 
Company 
Ethylene 13.2 14.l 60.2 29.2 54.5 83.6 
Low Density Polyethylene 265.3 336.0 364.2 266.6 368.7 453.6 
Sulphur 3.0 9.8 11. l 15.3 23.8 17.3 




Qatar: Production (quantity) 
of Major Industrial Companies, 1982 - 1987 
(thousand tons) 











Qatar Steel Company 
Concrete Bars 
Iron ore fines 
Qatar Flour Mills Company 
Flour No. (A) 








1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
677.0 883.2 918.7 894.9 1018.5 964.0 
13.2 15.0 12.0 12.2 
288.5 162.1 259.5 239.0 
72.4 
20.1 18.5 19.1 17.8 
0.2 





484.6 465.0 470.8 503.7 495.5 502.6 










8.0 11.5 54.7 31.1 76.1 94.4 
126.5 139.4 153.3 137.9 198.3 167.8 
6.0 25.0 28.0 29.2 48.2 47.4 
Source: Central Statistical Organization, Annual Statistical Abstract, eighth Issue, July 1988. 
Fertilizer 
While considered a major success by many analysts9, the country's 
fertilizer industry is beset with a number of problems: 
(9) See for example, "Qatar," in Arab Industry Review, 1987/88 (Bahrain: Falcon Publishing Co., 
1987), p. 124 
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1. Sales of ammonia and urea manufactured by Qatar Fertilizer Com-
pany (QAFCO) fell consistently during 1980-1983, and the turna-
round in 1984 (Table 3) was not sufficient to restore production to its 
1980 level. Sales fell again in 1985, and by 1987 were only 52 percent 
of their 1984 value. 
2. In 1984, QAFCO made a record net profit of QR170 million but this 
fell back to QR109 million in 1985, despite record output with 
ammonia production up to 640,000 tons and urea up to 744,000 tons. 
In 1986, production again set a new record, totalling 1,018,000 tons. 
In 1987, QAFCO reduced its losses by around QR12 million, with 
ammonia production rising to 682,000 tons, although urea produc-
tion fell. 
3. At present, QAFCO is facing difficulties because of the adverse 
trends in world markets and the glut in the oil market and subsequent 
reductions in feedstock. Despite this, QAFCO has been considering 
building a third ammonia plant to produce up to 500 tons of 
ammonia a day. 
4. Although QAFCO feels confident about competition from other 
producers given the advantages of cheap gas, the company's two 
major markets, India and China, set up their own fertilizer industries 
and this trend will challenge QAFCO to find new markets for its 
products. 
Petrochemicals 
In the case of petrochemicals: 
1. Sales of ethylene produced by Qatar Petrochemical Company 
(QPCO) have been volatile. A drastic fall in its sales in 1982 and 1983 
was a reflection of feedstock shortages which limited gas to the Umm 
Said facility, resulting in capacity under-utilization of about 50 per-
cent. The situation worsened as associated gas supplies declined in 
1982 and 1983. 
2. Around 73 percent of the designed capacity was utilized in 1984, lea-
ding to a 25 percent increase in the production of ethylene. However 
the rise in production in 1984 was more than offset by a 30 percent 
drop in ethylene prices on the world market. 
3. Sales of ethylene soared in 1984 but fell by 51.4 percent in 1985, 
compared with a 326 percent increase in sales in 1984. 
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4. QAPCO was operating at 55 percent of its installed capacity in 1985. 
The fall in output was due to Qatar's decision to bring crude oil pro-
duction into line with its OPEC quota, resulting in a reduced supply 
of feedstock to QAPCO. 
5. The company's QR156 million loss in 1985 was its biggest ever, when 
ethylene production fell to only 66 percent of capacity. Higher output 
in 1986, amounting to 90 percent of capacity, helped to push 
QAPCO's losses down to QR57 million in 1986. In 1987, cost cutting 
measures and stronger polyethylene prices helped turn this loss into a 
QR85 million profit. 
6. With completion in late 1985 of a $60 million ethane recovery unit 
(which maximizes ethane recovery from the ethane rich gas), a suffi-
cient supply of feedstock to allow production at full capacity will be 
available in coming years as long as oil production does not drop 
below 300,000 barrels per day. 
7. Most of the ethylene output has been absorbed until now in the 
manufacture of low density polyethylene, mostly for use in the plastic 
and packaging industries in neighboring countries. 
8. The long term advantage of QAPCO is that the plant is designed to 
run on gas, while most petrochemical plants run on naphtha. With 
abundant cheap gas available in the near future as a result of the 
North Field project, QAPCO is expected to be competitive even in a 
depressed market. 
Cement 
The cement industry has also experienced a series of major difficul-
ties: 
1. Qatar's cement factory at Umm Bab was the first of the country's 
non-oil heavy industries established and is a joint venture between the 
government and the private sector. Production started in 1969 with 
an initial annual capacity of 100,000 tons. Capacity was increased to 
260,000 tons in 1974175 and to 300,000 tons by 1976/77. An ambi-
tious plan to increase cement production capacity by a further 2,000 
tons a day was unveiled in the early 1980s, but has not been imple-
mented because of the large financial costs to both the government 
and private sector and the general slowdown in the demand for 
cement brought on by the decline in economic activity following the 
post 1982 deterioration in oil revenues. 
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2. Increasing competition from low cost foreign suppliers, mainly in the 
Gulf region, has also played a major role in reducing output and 
sales. 
3. A twenty percent protective tariff on imports of cement was intro-
duced in Qatar when the cement factory started production in 1969. 
In the 1970s, this tariff was lifted as the construction boom caused the 
demand for cement to exceed local production capacity. As the 
demand for cement dropped again in the early eighties, the cement 
industry could not benefit from tariff protection since imports were 
now coming from the neighboring countries and were not subject to 
tariffs in accordance with Gulf Co-operation Council regulations. 
4. Faced with these realities, the Qatar National Cement Company, 
which owns and operates the factory, cut the price of its cement twice 
during the latter part of 1983 in order to regain its share of the local 
market. Sales of ordinary and sulphate resisting cement improved 
quickly to 259,500 tons in 1984, an increase of around 60 percent over 
the 1983 level, though they remained at around 82 percent of total 
production capacity. The company's share of the local market also 
increased to around 65 percent in 1984 as compared with an average 
of 35-40 percent during 1981-83, but its total revenue did not improve 
significantly because of the price cutbacks. 
5. In 1985 sales dropped again by around 7.5 percent to 240,000 tons of 
Portland Cement. This decline continued, so that by 1987 (Table 3) 
company sales were QR44.2 million versus 74.9 in 1982. 
Prospects for Qatar's cement industry do not look bright. The recent 
sharp fall in oil prices and the slowdown in public and private building 
activity has reduced domestic demand. Export possibilities are bleak in 
the already glutted Gulf market. 
In addition, the Qatar National Cement Company suffers from the 
disadvantage of being one of the oldest and smallest plants in the 
region. It does not enjoy the economies of scale that the larger plants 
have and it is consequently less efficient. 
The situation has not been helped by the fact that influential mer-
chants are planning to build mills which would use imported clinker in 
direct competition to QNCC. The struggle for market share is likely to 
become even more fierce because of the general decline in demand and 
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the higher Omani tariffs which have almost closed-off that important 
market10• 
Steel 
Qatar was one of the first Arab countries to capitalize on the potential 
offered by new iron and steel industries, making the decision to build a 
direct reduction-based steelworks as early as 1974. The works started up 
in 1987, with production rising gradually to a peak level of 484,600 tons 
of steel bars in 1982, dropping again slightly in 1983 and 1984, attaining 
a new peak of around 503,000 tons in 1985, and leveling off at this rate 
in 1987. For the period from 1980 to 1985, actual production of steel 
bars was an average of nearly 146 percent of rated capacity. 
It should be noted that with the marked exception of QASCO, actual 
production at plants in operation in the Gulf has been generally well 
below design capacity, primarily because of a lack of adequate training 
of personnel, outdated technology and competition from imported 
products. QASCO achieved its high rates of productivity because of 
new technology (the Midrex gas fed direction reduction process) in a 
new factory, in addition to advanced management systems including 
employee incentive programs, productivity and quality improvement 
schemes, and careful control of specifications of production. 11 
In spite of its excellent production figures and even though its steel is 
of highest quality, the Qatar Steel Company has faced increasing 
financial problems since the start of production: 
1. Initial capital costs were significantly higher than expected and inte-
rest charges have been an important financial burden on the com-
pany. 
2. Operating costs have also been quite high, because of the high mana-
gement and marketing fees charged the company. 
3. Beginning in 1986, the company experienced for the first time a fall in 
demand for its output. At the beginning of 1986 Qasco asked its sha-
reholders for a QR 150 million($ 41.2 million) capital increase to ease 
its financial problems-- the company lost $ 13. 7 million in 1985, 
(10) Charles Gurdon, "Cement," in Arab Industry Review, 1987/83, p. 52. 
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bringing accumulated losses since it started in 1987 to about $ 109 
million. Qasco is presently capitalized at QR 300 million($ 82.4 mil-
l . ) 12 ion. 
4. Qasco has faced growing competition in its main export markets in 
recent years when demand for steel has been on the decline. These 
markets are the lifeline of the company since in the period from 1980 
to 1985 an average of nearly 90 percent of its annual output of steel 
bars was exported, with the domestic market absorbing about 10 
percent of output. 
5. Foreign competition forced Gulf prices down to around $220 a ton in 
1986, about$ 20 a ton below the world level. In April 1985, the GCC 
recommended introduction of a 20 percent tariff on imports from 
non-member countries. 
Export sales are concentrated in the Gulf where Qatar enjoys the 
advantage of low transport costs and fast delivery times. Saudi Arabia 
alone accounted for around 45 percent of exports in 1984-85 with 
Kuwait and the UAE accounting for a similar proportion. The remai-
ning 10-12 percent went mainly to Bahrain, Iraq and Oman. 
With the start of production in 1984 at the large complex of the Saudi 
Iron and Steel Company at Jubail, which has a capacity of 800,000 tons 
of steel rods and bars a year, much of the potential of the Saudi market 
has been lost. Saudi steel has also become a direct competitor in the 
Gulf market where demand has dropped gradually since 1983, because 
of the slowdown in construction activity. 
In the face of these challenges, Qasco has had to cut its export price a 
number of times since 1982. As a result, revenue per ton of steel bars 
exported dropped by nearly 30 percent between 1980 and 1984 thus 
exacerbating the company's financial problems. 
In the final analysis it is possible to argue that the problems that have 
beset Qatar's steel industry are in part symptomatic of the problems of 
the steel industry worldwide and in part due to the failure of the Gulf 
countries up to now to achieve any degree of industrial co-ordination 
and integration. 
(12) "Oil slump Kills Hopes of Qapco Revival, "Middle East Economic Digest, MEED Social Report, 
Qatar (August 1986), p. 10. 
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Qatar's pioneering effort to introduce integrated direct reduction/ 
electric arc furnace steel-making to exploit the available resources of 
associated gas which had previously been flared at oil well sites set the 
pattern for the second generation of Gulf steel plants. But when the 
third generation is installed, the plants will most likely have much 
greater production capacity, following the international trend and faci-
litating competition on equal terms with the huge plants now installed 
around the world. In the meantime, the relatively small scale steel pro-
ducers in Qatar will continue to face severe threats from the much 
bigger plants in other regions. 13 
Industrial Efficiency 
One of the aims of industrial planning has been to encourage the 
establishment of industries that use the output of Qatar's heavy indus-
tries as intermediate products. Industries producing tiles, pre-cast con-
crete items, fine lime and plastic products fit this category very well, 
although their combined demand for cement, steel bars, lime and 
polyethylene is still only a small proportion of the total output of the 
industries concerned. 
As might be expected, the four heavy manufacturing industries 
accounted for the bulk of the gross value of output and valued added. 
Thus, the gross value of output in the chemical and plastic products, 
non-metallic mineral products and basic metal industries amounted to 
QRl, 905.8 million in 1983 which is nearly 72 percent of the total gross 
value of output in manufacturing industry. The combined value added 
in these three industry categories also amounted to around 78 percent of 
total value added in the manufacturing sector, which stood at QRl,464 
million in 1983. 
In terms of value added another picture of the country's dual eco-
nomy emerges: 14 
1. The share of value added in gross output is the highest in the manu-
facture of fabricated metal products (106.7 percent), followed by 
jewelry (87 .6 percent), fertilizers and pesticides (84. 7 percent). 
(13) Nabil al-Tayyeb, "The Future for Steel in the Arab Gulf States, "Arab Gulf Industry (August 
1986). p. 93. 
(14) United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Qatar: Towards Industrial Diversification 
of an Oil-Based Economy (Vienna: United Nations, 1988), pp. 18-19. 
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2. The high share of value added in gross output in most of the heavy 
industries partly reflects the incidence of technical progress that has 
gone into the productive process. 
3. The relatively low share of value added in gross output (23.3 percent) 
in the manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco is a reflection of 
the high cost of imported raw material and services. The country is 
almost totally dependent on imports for manufactured food items. 
The Industrial Survey of 1983, published by the Central Statistical 
Organization in 1985, attempted to measure productivity levels in the 
sub-sectors of manufacturing. That survey produced several interes-
ting patterns: 
1. In 1983, 15,558 persons were engaged in maufacturing industries, 
of which 4,058 were employed in non-metallic mineral products 
and 2,557 in chemical and petroleum industries. 
2. Value added per employee was the highest in petroleum refineries 
(QR480,000), followed by industrial chemicals other than fertili-
zers (QR360,000) and fertilizers and pesticides (QR316,000). 
3. Labor productivity was the lowest in the manufacturing of soap, 
cleaning preparations and perfumes (QRl0,000). 
4. Value added per worker in light activites was far below the average 
for the manufacturing sector (as it was in the case of the share of 
gross output). 
5. A number of industries--slaughtering, preparing and preserving 
meat and grain mill products which operate under economies of 
scale, have working costs which are quite high as a result of the 
high cost of raw materials. 
Internal Integration 
As Whittingham15 has noted, the problem for Qatar is that a handful 
of small export-oriented factories, of the kind to be found in any oil-
producing country, will never be able to compete with much larger 
production facilities. At the same time, Qatar's domestic market has 
minimal need for heavy industrial products. 
(15) Ken Whittingham, "Qatar," in The Middle East Review, 1988 (Saffron Walden, Essex: World of 
Information, 1987), p. 135. 
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What it does require are semi-manufactured goods, machines and 
equipment; yet these kinds of industrial ventures do not exist in the 
country. In short, industrial growth may be slowing down not just due 
to developments in the external markets, but also because of the inabi-
lity of industries to date to integrate themselves into the domestic 
market. 16 
This is another aspect of the country's dualistic industrial structure. 
The extent to which problems exist are, of course, an empirical ques-
tion, but one that should be addressed before any conclusions can be 
drawn as to the future development of the manufacturing sector. 
To determine the relative extent to which manufacturing has been 
affected (positively or negatively) by developments in the rest of the 
economy, the factor analysis described above (Table 2) was extended to 
identify a series of potential impacts on the industrial sector. 
The mechanism by which exports could act as an "engine of growth" 
(or leading sector) and the determinants of the overall impact of an 
export stimulation on the economy have been well discussed in the lite-
rature.17 In the classic situation of staples, exports contributed to eco-
nomic growth directly (through direct contributions to Gross Domestic 
Product), and indirectly through contributions to GDP through the 
medium of spread (or carry-over) effects. 18 
This indirect contribution to growth embraces Hirschman-type 
linkages 19 and can broadly be considered as a sequence of multiplier-
accelerator mechanisms, whereby increases in non-oil GDP augment 
demand for various sectoral--manufacturing, services, distribution--
outputs. Theoretically, indirect contributions (or spread effects) can 
continue to accrue long after some export stimulus has occurred. The 
overall impact of an export stimulus on the economy has many deter-
minants including technology, the propensity to import, the extent to 
(16) Ibid. (17) G.W. Bertram "Economic Growth in Canadian Industry, "Canadian Journal of Economics and 
PoUtlcal Science (May 1963); and G.W. Bertram, "The Relevance of the Canadian Wheat Boom 
in Canadian Economic Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics (1973). (18) M.M. Metwally and H.U. Tamaschke, "Oil Exports and Economic Growth in the Middle East," 
Kyldos (1980), pp. 499-500. 
(19) Cf. A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, Conn: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1958). 
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which investment opportunities generated are accepted domestically, 
the ability to attract foreign factors and so on. 
Obviously, neither the timing pattern exhibited by, nor the relative 
sizes of, exports' direct and indirect contributions to growth need be 
fixed and could conceivably vary between subperiods, especially over 
long periods of economic development. Provided that investment 
opportunities generated by the growth of the export sector are 
exploited, the model predicts that economic growth will be a process of 
diversification about an export base. 
For policy purposes, it is of some interest to determine the factors res-
ponsible for these movements. Were improvements in industrial diver-
sification largely the response to spread effects-increases in industrial 
demand created by an expanding non-oil sector of the economy? 
These first two effects are fairly straighforward, and have been iden-
tified in a number of case studies on primary product exporters.20 
A third effect is the one related to oil financed government expendi-
tures or the so called "Dutch Disease" effect. This phenomenon stems 
from the overvalution of the domestic exchange rate following an oil 
revenue boom. Here, it is assumed that the increase in domestic infla-
tion stemming from stepped up governmental expenditures is concen-
trated in those sectors of the economy that do not face foreign competi-
tion. 
Due to the presence of foreign substitutes for most manufactured 
goods produced in Qatar, economic theory would predict a lower rela-
tive rate of price increase in the country's industrial sectors. Along the 
lines identified in the section on productivity, the resulting fall in the 
relative profitability of manufacturing (cheaper imports and price/cost 
squeeze) may have caused a shift in resources to non-traded activities. 
In Qatar, the resulting suppression of the industrial sector should 
depend in large part on the composition of industry i.e., the relative 
amounts of traded and non-traded goods produced, and the extent to 
which domestic producers of traded goods are ·protected by tariffs 
(20) For an excellent series of case studies see Raymond F. Mikesell, Foreign Investment in the Petro-
leum and Mineral Industries: Case studies of Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries 







and/or quotas from foreign competitors. Ceteris paribus we would 
expect the effect to be present in Qatar because of the dominance of the 
oil sector and the fact that the country is largely open to world market 
forces and foreign competition. In addition, the Dutch Disease effect 
has been identified in two neighboring countries: Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia.21 
In his study of Saudi Arabian industrialization, Looney22 found in 
the case of tradeables that: 
1. Government expenditures and credit have played a major role in sti-
mulating production. 
2. The problems associated with an appreciating exchange rate, the 
Dutch Disease, have tended to reduce output. This applies to both 
long and short run movements in the case of agriculture, mining and 
refining, and shorter run movements in the case of non oil manufac-
turing. 
There is evidence that, at least in the case of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, oil revenues have tended to work at somewhat cross proposes 
for the general class of tradeables. On the expenditure side, oil revenues 
have been converted into both effective demand and available credit 
that would obviously not have been present otherwise. On the other 
hand, the competitive effects associated with exchange appreciation 
have apparently offset any cost reducing affects stemming from lower 
cost imports of capital, intermediate goods, and labor. 
Clearly governments burdened with an overvalued real exchange rate 
will find it increasingly difficult to attain diversification through 
expansion of the traded goods sector. 
The methodology used to measure the relative extent of these effects 
in Qatar consisted of the following: 
1. The factor analysis presented above was extended to include on a 
case-by case basis proxies for each of the three linkage effects. Three 
dates were examined: (a} 1975--incorporating the initial effects of the 
(21) Mohammad Al-Sabah, "The 'Dutch Disease' in an Oil-Exporting Country: Kuwait," OPEC 
Review (Summer, 1988), pp. 129-144. 
(22) Robert E. Looney, "Oil Revenues and the Dutch Disease in Saudi Arabia, Differential Impacts on 
Sectoral Growth," Working Paper, Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate 
School (1988). 
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oil price shocks, (b) 1981--the last year of expanding oil revenues, and 
(c) 1985--the last year for which comparable data was available. 
2. The first set of factor analysis for each year are teh same as those pre-
sented in Table 2. Four sectors and eight variables are included. Each 
variable is depicted twice: (a) its share of non-oil GDP, and (b) its 
share of absorption (consumption plus investment expenditures). 
3. The second set of four factor exercises examined the sectoral linkage 
effects associated with the development of the oil sector. Here the oil 
sector is also depicted by its share of non-oil GDP and its share of 
absorption. The impact of the oil sector is measured by its correlation 
coefficents on each of the four sectors (for brevity only the resulting 
factor scores are presented). 
4. Generalized linkage effects were estimated in the third set of factor 
exercises. Here linkages are defined in terms of sector correlations on 
non-oil GDP, with non-oil GDP included in the analysis as its share 
of absorption and total Gross Domestic Product. As with oil the 
extent of these linkage effects are measured by the correlation of 
non-oil GDP variables with each of the four sectors. 
5. Finally, the Dutch Disease or sectoral shift factors were introduced 
with the four sectoral variables. Here the shift factors are proxied by 
the change in inflation (from 1974 to the year examined) and the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (again from 1974 to the year 
examined). The assumption here is that inflationary periods will 
increase the profitability of non-oil tradeables and the expense of 
tradeables, with manufacturing considered a tradeable. The same is 
true for appreciation of the real exchange rate. As with the previous 
two linkage effects, shift effects were measured by the correlation of 
non-oil GDP variables with each of the four factors. 
6. The factor scores were computed for each of the oil producing coun-
tries (Libya was added for the basis of comparison) for each of the 
four exercises. The linkage and shift effects are depicted by the 
change in factor scores (from the initial structural dimension) to the 
ones obtained by introducing (again on an individual basis) each of 
the three effects under examination. 
The results (Tables 5-7) of these exercises show several interesting 
patterns. Initially in 1975: 
1. The oil sector had not had time to have much of an impact on the 
28 
Table 5 
Qatar: Factors Affecting Relative 
Industrial Performance--Linkage and Shift Effects, 1975 
~ (Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distrib Serv 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
Qatar 0.27 1.82 1.84 0.13 
UAE -1.15 2.00 1.88 -0.90 
Bahrain 2.74 -0.35 0.91 -0.01 
Saudi Arabia 0.90 1.06 -1.00 0.65 
Oman -1.53 I.IO -0.21 0.59 
Kuwait 0.05 -0.83 -0.50 2.08 
Libya -0.73 0.98 -0.60 1.35 
Oil Economies Impact of Oil 
Qatar 0.18(=) 1.79( =) 1.90( =) 0.14( +) 
UAE -1.23( =) 1.66( - ) 1.90( =) - 1.00( =) 
Bahrain 2.69( =) -0.38( =) 0.92( =) 0.06( =) 
Saudi Arabia 0.98( =) 1.81( +) -1.09( =) 0.70( =) 
Oman -1.56( =) 1.03( =) -0.20(=) 0.50( =) 
Kuwait 0.21( +) 0.24( +) -0.90(-) 2.22( =) 
Libya -0.83(=) 0.57(-) -0.40( +) 1.20( - ) 
Oil Economies Impact of Domestic Linkages 
Qatar 0.43( +) 1.86( =) 1.64( - ) 0.71( +) 
UAE -1.33(-) 1.83( - ) 1.99( +) 0.14( +) 
Bahrain 2.51(-) -0.31(=) 0.85( =) 0.94( +) 
Saudi Arabia 0.97( =) 1.22( +) -0.99(=) -0.50(-) 
Oman -1.32( +) 1.14( =) -0.04( +) -1.49(-) 
Kuwait 0.60( +) -0.25( +) -0.43(=) -2.29(-) 
Libya -0.32( +) 0.98( =) -0.58( =) 0.98(-) 
I 
Oil Economies Impact of Dutch Disease Factors 
Qatar 0.19(-) 1.73( =) 1.25( - ) 0.18(=) 
I UAE - 1.01( - ) 2.25( +) 1.30(-) -1.01(-) 
Bahrain 2.73(-) 0.02( +) 0.65(-) -0.17(-) 
Saudi Arabia 1.04( +) 1.70( +) -1.42(-) 0.36(-) 
Oman -1.71(-) 0.48( - ) 0.41( +) 0.89( +) 
Kuwait 0.07( +) -0.90(=) -0.04( +) 1.93( - ) 
Libya -0.96(-) 0.34(-) 0.07( +) 1.64( +) 
Note: ( ) indicates movement in ranking relative to sector dimension factor scores. 
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Table 6 
Qatar: Factors Affecting Relative 
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l'able 7 
Qatar: Factors Affecting Relative 
Industrial Performance--Linkage and Shift Effects, 1985 
(Factor Scores) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Manufact Construct Distrib Serv 
Oil Economies Sectoral Dimension 
Qatar 0.79 0.29 0.16 2.75 
UAE 1.37 1.23 1.34 -0.02 
Bahrain 0.86 0.40 1.96 0.59 
Saudi Arabia -0.16 1.60 -0.78 0.57 
Oman -1.53 0.39 1.11 0.23 
Kuwait -0.42 -0.87 -0.22 1.00 
Libya -0.94 1.53 -0.83 1.04 
Oil Economies Impact of Oil 
Qatar 1.03( +) 0.20(=) -0.09(-) 2.36(-) 
UAE 0.88(-) 1.39( +) 1.63( +) 0.77( +) 
Bahrain 1.02( +) 0.30( =) 1.63( +) 0.12(-) 
Saudi Arabia -0.15(=) 1.53(=) -0.75(=) 0.59( =) 
Oman -1.72(-) o:5o( + > 1.37( +) 1.01( +) 
Kuwait -0.62(-) -0.84( =) -0.01( +) 1.49( +) 
Libya -0.77( +) 1.47( =) -0.85(=) 0.98( =) 
Oil Economies Impact of Domestic Linkages 
Qatar 0.51(-) 0.33( =) -0.12(-) 2.51(-) 
UAE 1.35( =) 1.33( +) 1.54( +) 0.34( +) 
Bahrain 0.80( =) 0.37( =) 1.70(-) 0.37(-) 
Saudi Arabia 0.02( +) 1.53( =) -0.5~( +) 0.67( +) 
Oman -1.52( =) 0.48( +) 1.44(-;-) 0.61( +) 
Kuwait -0.14( +) -0.82(=) 0.24( +) 1.33( +) 
Libya -1.04(-) 1.51(=) -0.80(=) 1.05( =) 
Oil Economies Impact of Dutch Disease Factors 
Qatar 0.87(=) 0.48( +) 0.06(-) 2.91( +) 
UAE 1.25(-) 1.23( =) 1.24( - ) -0.02(=) 
Bahrain 0.88( =) 0.44( =) 1.89( =) 0.62( =) 
Saudi Arabia -0.35(-) 1.56(=) -0.85(=) 0.54( =) 
I Oman -1.58( =) 0.30( =) 1.14( =) 0.14(-) 
·r Kuwait -0.70(-) -0.97(-) -0.26(=) 0.84(-) 
I 
Libya -0.88( =) 1.48( =) -0.75(=) 1.02( =) 
I 




seven countries under examination. As might have been anticipated, 
this impact was generally positive (the negative impacts for UAE and 
Libya are most likely the result of the simple fact that these countries 
began their construction boom shortly after the others and as a result 
had a relative-but not absolute decline-in construction activity). 
2. At the beginning of the period under consideration, and before its 
heavy industries existed, the manufacturing sector was significantly 
integrated with the non-oil sectors of the economy. This linkage was 
both positive in the sense of demand linkages with non-oil GDP and 
negative in the sense that Dutch Disease effects were reducing its 
output below that anticipated from the benchmark results. 
By the end of the oil boom (1981): 
1. Qatar as well as most of the oil countries were receiving net impacts 
from the oil sector. Most likely this reflects the fact that the direct 
government expenditure of oil revenues has gone to expand 
government services and construction. The expansion of these sec-
tors, along with distributional activities, has drawn resources that 
might otherwise have been used in industrial activities. 
2. In terms of domestic linkages, Qatar was still not experiencing any 
positive impacts. This is in contrast to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, 
Oman and Kuwait, each of which saw their industrial activities 
increase as a result of the growth of their non-oil economies. 
3. Finally, manufacturing in Qatar was still feeling some of the effects 
of the Dutch Disease, which apparently resulted in a shift of 
resources to other activities. It should be noted however that these 
shifts were not nearly as great as those experienced by Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. 
Finally, by 1985: 
1. Manufacturing in Qatar was finally experiencing some positive lin-
kages with the oil sector. However, this was offset by negative lin-
kages with the non-oil sector of the economy. In this regard, Libya 
was the only other country experiencing similar effects. 
2. Perhaps because of relatively prudent monetary and fiscal policy 
during most of the period under consideration, industrial output in 
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Qatar was no longer affected by Dutch Disease effects. Again this is 
in fairly sharp contrast to the situation in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
The findings presented above are largely consistent with earlier stu-
dies of development in oil based countries--these countries have for the 
most part developed along lines fundamentally different than those 
experienced by the staple economies. On the other hand, it appears that 
in oil economies such as Qatar the general absence until fairly recently 
of significant spread efforts has made the industrialization process 
much less predictable than in those countries experiencing classic pat-
terns of stable development. The large role played by the governments 
of Qatar and the other oil economies has resulted in the predominance 
of discretionary elements over market prices as the chief factor respon-
sible for the allocation of resources. 
As noted, the arrival of a viable and self sufficient manufacturing 
industrial structure has long been the prime objective of Qatar's 
government. Industry is seen as the key to successful economic diversi-
fication and as the main assurance of continued self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth. Since the large increases in oil revenues in the 1970s, the 
government has directed a substantial portion of its huge development 
outlays towards the creation of an adequate industrial infrastructure 
and the establishment of certain major state and joint public/private 
heavy industries. 
It is clear from the patterns described above, however, that industrial 
diversification has proceeded at rates lower than might have been anti-
cipated and that this has stemmed from the lack of internal stimuli from 
other sectors of the economy. Consequently the process of industriali-
zation has depended on external rather than internal dynamics23 • 
As Abdulla Hamad al-Moajil has noted for the Gulf countries as a 
whole: 
The fact that industrialization has been an external rather than 
internal process for the societies of the Gulf resulted in a false unders-
tanding of the true meaning of industrialization based on a confusion 
between the theory of industrialization in its broadest sense and the 
practical process of installing industrial plant through turnkey contracts 
(23)Abdulla Hamad al-Moajil, "Industrialization in the Arab Gulf States," Arab Gulf Industry 
(January 1986), p; 9 
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with foreign construction and engineering companies. Factories set up 
in the Gulf on this turnkey basis belong to the region in a graphical 
sense, but the existence and continued functioning of the factories is 
dependent on external factors. In other words, the process of industria-
lization in the Gulf has tended to be a geographical rather than an his-
torical phenomenon24. 
These effects appear to have been magnified in Qatar. 
Conclusions 
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn concerning Qatar's indus-
trialization experience to date: 25 
1. In Qatar the manufacture of higher-value products requires imported 
technology, and this requires the intensive application of working 
capital and energy. 
2. The nature of high-technology industry creates a demand for highly 
trained manpower and for experience in management, neither of which 
can be built up quickly. This has forced Qatar to depend on imported 
skilled manpower in order to fill the local manpower gap. 
3. Individual emirates such as Qatar find it difficult to enter interna-
tional markets, and this forces Qatar to depend on foreign companies 
for international sales of the products of its factories. It is here, 
perhaps, in the problem of entering international markets, that the Gulf 
Co-operation Council could strengthen the position of Qatar as well as 
that of the rest of the Gulf Emirates. 
More specifically, the problems facing heavy industry in Qatar stem 
from the fact that: 26 
1. No really autonomous, integrated, multi-sector industrial basis is 
being established. Instead, scattered industries have been established, 
with each plant related to a parent company abroad. 
2. In many areas, the country is facing poor prospects for its major 
(24) Ibid., p. 9 (25) See also Mohammed Al-Kubaisi, "Manufacturing Industry in Qatar," The Arab Gulf Journal 
(April 1982), pp. 91-92. (26) A general discussion of these points is given in Muhammad Abd Al-Shafi, "Industrial Develop-




exports because of saturated world markets and duplication of produc-
tive facilities in other Gulf countries. 
3. A complex dependence upon foreign countries has come into being: 
commercial, financial and technological. 
4. Because of problems in expanding agriculture there is little integra-
tion between that sector and industry. This is particularly the case in 
areas such as fertilizers, where local demand is fairly stagnant. 
Qatar's heavy industries will continue to face a challenge as the world 
markets for almost totally import-oriented products continue in a 
recession. While the Qatar Fertilizer Company continues to earn a 
profit, the Qatar Steel Company and Qatar Petroleum Company are 
running at a loss. A potential threat to the country's heavy industries is 
the emergence of heavy industries in the neighboring Gulf countries that 
edge into traditional Qatari markets. 
Since the profit margins from trade have fallen in recent years, Qatari 
nationals seem to look for long-term potential returns from well-
planned and virtually guaranteed import-substituting industries and 
industries producing products for the regional market. 
A major factor behind the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council in 1981 was the desire to create a regional marketplace to relieve 
the almost total dependence on oil revenues and the massive cost of 
imports to meet the needs of the fast-growing population in the Gulf, 
whether native or immigrant. Unfortunately, however, Qatar's import 
statistics show that in the first five years of the Council little had 
changed: 
1. Around 50% of the country's imports still came from Japan, Bri-
tain, West Germany and the United States. 
2. Imports from the GCC states amounted to only 5% of the 
country's foreign supplies. 
3. More than QR2000 million of a total import bill of QR3046 million 
was spent on machinery, transport, semi-manufactured and 
manufactured goods. 
Clearly, until Qatar and its Gulf neighbors develop an engineering 
industrial sector, the idea of a regionally integrated industrial economy 
will remain a dream. 
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Kuwait long ago gave up the idea of investing heavily in all but the 
most obvious import substitution industries, relying instead on foreign 
investment of accumulated surpluses, profits from which now provide 
around 50 percent of state revenues. Qatar may be tempted to change 
course and follow the same path, once gas income joins oil receipts 
which are expected to increase in the next decade. 
It is quite apparent that the banks operating in Qatar have little con-
fidence in the industrial process. While plenty of credit is available for 
consumer spending and short-term investment loans, few banks are 
prepared to offer the long-term financing needed for private sector 
industrial projects. 27 
With the sharp fall in oil prices, the era of the rapid transformation 
and growth of Qatar's manufacturing industry is over. The heavy 
industries are now in place and are required more than ever to prove 
their worth. The current economic slow-down and the proliferation of 
competing light industries throughout the Gulf can only reduce the 
incentives for private sector investment in industry. 28 
(27)Ken Whittingham, "Qatar," in World of Information, The Middle East Review, 1988, p.138. 
(28) Arab Industry Review 1987/88, p.127 
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